The following paper identifies two different urban policy regimes in Latin Americaneoliberal and socialist-and traces their origins to the distinct interests and capacities of local elites and activists in the region's cities in the mid-to-late twentieth century. While agricultural and commercial interests paid a high price for the growth of importsubstituting industrialization, and therefore deployed free trade zones (and similar institutions) in traditional export centers in the 1960s and 1970s, their industrial rivals bore the brunt of austerity and adjustment in the free market era, and therefore adopted compensatory measures designed to increase the "social wage" in the 1980s and 1990s.
Introduction
A substantial and growing body of literature identifies and accounts for the emergence of distinct types of urban political economy in the late twentieth century world system. For instance, Peter Evans (2002) and his colleagues extol the virtues of "livable cities." Saskia Sassen (1991) discusses the contradictions of "global cities." Don Pinnock (1989) labels Cape Town a "garrison city." And Richard Florida (2002; see also Scott 2006) has made a veritable industry out of the so-called creative city. 1 The inventory of names and labels threatens to outgrow the population of cities in need of classification, however, and taxonomic caution is therefore in order. After all, New York has simultaneously been classified as "global," "post-Fordist," "creative," and "divided" (Sassen 1991; Mayer 1991; Florida 2002; Fainstein 1992) , and Los Angeles appears to earn a new adjective or sobriquet almost every other year (Soja 1995; Low 1997 ).
The following paper therefore tempts fate by labeling and analyzing the dialectical evolution of two different types of urban political economy-neoliberal and socialist-in late twentieth century and early twenty first century Latin America. Part 1 identifies the ideological differences between the two types of city as well as their implications for public policy. While neoliberal cities prioritize accumulation, and therefore use tax breaks, regulatory rollbacks, and the repression of organized labor to attract and retain foreign direct investment, their socialist rivals prioritize distribution, and therefore use social funds, microcredit arrangements, and participatory institutions to employ and empower their citizens. Part 2 treats the emergence of municipal 1 We could go on. Tim Hall and Phil Hubbard (1996; Harris 1997) weigh the costs and benefits of "entrepreneurial cities." Gordon MacLeod (2002) expects entrepreneurial cities to be transformed into "revanchist cities." Susan Christopherson (1994) identifies and illuminates "fortress cities." And a host of scholars have discussed the "post-Fordist city" (see, e.g., Mayer 1994 ).
neoliberalism as a secondary city or hinterland reaction to the growth of urban primacy or bias in the middle of the twentieth century. While industrial interests in traditional population centers like Mexico City and São Paulo reaped the rewards of importsubstituting industrialization (ISI), and therefore organized to defend their gains, their agricultural and commercial rivals paid a high price for tariffs and foreign exchange controls, and therefore offset or compensated for the growth of urban bias by deploying free trade zones (and similar institutions) in secondary cities like Juárez and Manaus.
Part 3 traces the origins of municipal socialism to the breakdown of ISI and the arrival of the debt crisis and national neoliberal policies in the late twentieth century. While municipal neoliberals had already embraced foreign trade and investment, and therefore welcomed structural adjustment at the national level, their socialist rivals feared globalization, and responded with a variety of compensatory measures designed to increase the "social wage," not only in Mexico City and São Paulo but in other major cities like Lima, Montevideo, and Caracas. And, finally, Part 4 concludes by offering a Polanyian interpretation of the seemingly odd convergence of neoliberal and socialist policy tendencies in some municipalities today-suggesting that, whatever their ideological preferences, municipal authorities must balance accumulation and distribution if they are to survive and prosper in a globalized world. If not, both national and local authorities will continue to engage in the bitter struggles over policy responses to globalization currently under way in Venezuela and Bolivia.
Intellectual context
Our paper departs from a puzzling feature of the literature on Latin American cities. While municipal authorities have traditionally been deprived of political and economic resources, and have thereby garnered a reputation for impotence or even indolence, they have at times encouraged or exploited experiments in social and economic policymaking, and have thereby anticipated-rather than reacted to-national policy imperatives. Take, for example, the case of free market economic policies.
Municipal authorities established or encouraged the growth of free trade zones (FTZs) in Mexico, Central America, and the Dominican Republic in the 1960s and 1970s-a full decade before the debt crisis put paid to ISI at the national level (World Bank 1992, Table A3 ).
Nor are FTZs isolated examples of municipal neoliberalism. Brazilian and Argentine municipalities have been competing for foreign transplants for well over a quarter of a century (Business Week 1979; Schumacher 1983; Lee 1989; Wheatley 1997) .
Andean city managers have called for the decentralization of economic decision making authority more broadly (Catanese 1973; Economist 1987 Economist , 2001 Forero 2004; Markey 2005; Eaton 2007 As the twentieth century progressed, however, other Latin American cities eschewed investment incentives in favor of distributive politics, and the region therefore increasingly played host to "socialist" as well as recognizably neoliberal cities.
Participatory budgeting initiatives have proliferated from southern Brazil to the rest of the region (Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Braütigam, 2004; Goldfrank 2006) . Recently decentralized public services like health care and education have been fortified, in at least some cases, at the local level (Ocampo and Martín 2003, Ch. IX) . And municipally administered social funds have allegedly compensated the poor for the high cost of free market reform throughout the region (Siri 2000; Tendler and Serrano 1999; Tendler 2000; Menocal 2004 who "work through local governments" when they are "headed by the party faithful" and bypass local governments when they are not (Tendler 2000, p. 116) . And Rosemary Thorp notes that the impulse for decentralization "has always come from the centre-in that sense it is always top down" (Thorp quoted in Menocal 2004, p. 727) .
Second, the existing literature tends to treat subnational social and economic policies in isolation from one another (see Heller 1995 for an important exception to the rule based on Asian materials). Students of municipal neoliberalism rarely engage, let alone study, the question of social policy and students of municipal socialism rarely entertain, let alone study, the question of accumulation. Nowhere is the dialogue of the deaf-to which we have admittedly been party-more apparent than in the expansive and all but entirely distinct literatures on "subnational industrial policy" (Montero 2001 ) and "participatory budgeting" in Brazil.
And, finally, the existing literature is all but silent on the conditions for subnational success and failure. While many analysts examine only successful examples of local experiments, and thereby render themselves vulnerable to charges of selection bias (see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) , others treat local experiments as policy outcomes to be explained, and thereby sidestep the question of their subsequent success and failure.
We call each of the aforementioned practices into question by noting that subnational social and economic policy initiatives: (1) often anticipate, rather than respond to, their national analogs; (2) are almost invariably in dynamic tension with each other; and (3) are necessarily circumscribed by social and political organization. Our stylized model of subnational experimentation is therefore straightforward. We hold that national social and economic policy regimes foster regionally distinctive winners and losers. While the winners reap the rewards of the national efforts, and therefore organize to exploit and defend their gains in national as well as local political space, the losers pay the price, and therefore attempt to cushion the blow by adopting or defending contrary policies at the local level whenever they can.
products nor as symptoms of their national analogs but as subnational reactions to their national rivals: import-substituting industrialization and free market reform respectively.
After all, ISI privileged industrial interests in large cities and their satellites and punished traditional agricultural and commercial interests in the hinterland (Hirschman 1968; Sheahan 1987) . 2 Agricultural and commercial elites responded to the perceived injustice by demanding and exploiting compensatory arrangements including-but not limited to-free trade zones (Schrank 2005) . And the oldest export platforms in the region are therefore found not in traditional industrial centers but in their peripheries. Table 1 lists Latin America's principal FTZ host cities at the dawn of the free market era as well as the dates of their initial forays into export manufacturing. as products of a relatively recent and unanticipated backlash against free market reform, 2 Agro-commercial interests had to pay higher prices for their traditionally imported inputs and to bear the burden of overvalued exchange rates that constituted an indirect export tax (Hirschman 1968) . 3 Only the Salvadorans established their first FTZ near their capital.
and have therefore garnered a good deal of commentary, they are in many ways the outgrowth of years of organizing and resistance in traditional working class strongholds.
In fact, many of the blue-and white-collar unions that gained ground in the ISI era refused to accept defeat at the hands of free market reform. On the contrary, in several cases the groups that were bearing the burden of national neoliberalism organized to defend their prior gains at the local level through "socialist" experiments like participatory budgeting and public employment programs-and thereby lay the foundation of national leftist counterattacks down the road. 4 Table 2 offers more or less parallel data on the diffusion of experiments in municipal socialism in Latin America and reveals a strong elective affinity with working class political influence.
Table 2 here
We trace variation in the success of subnational social and economic policies to variation in the organizational capacities of their principal supporters. Business incentives like FTZs tend to foster more sustainable investment, employment, and growth when they are deployed and defended by well-organized indigenous elites who have a vested interest in regional prosperity than when they are established and exploited by absentee landlords or foreign investors who are less committed to the local economy (Schrank 2005) . And efforts to bolster local participation and the social wage tend to prove sustainable where the industrial working classes and their middle-class allies are organized and their antagonists are disorganized-and tend to fail where rival parties and elites are able to counterattack (Goldfrank 2007) . Therefore, Figure 1 presents a stylized representation of our argument-an argument we seek to illustrate with comparative historical data drawn from Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela in the pages to follow.
Figure 1 here
Our cases have been purposively selected to illustrate-rather than provide a formal test of-the plausibility of our framework. We make no effort to generalize our core claims to the rest of the region and are more interested in concept formation than in causal analysis in any event (Weber 1949) . Undoubtedly, careful attention to other sets of variables and to the complexities of more individual cases -and especially the different capacities of municipal governments across countries -would be necessary to tease out the causal relationships we propose here. But we believe that concept formation is a necessary precondition of causal analysis and therefore hope that by introducing the concepts of municipal neoliberalism and socialism we will have paved the way for more systematic analyses down the road.
Municipal Neoliberalism in Late Twentieth Century Latin America
Municipal neoliberals insulate their private sector constituents from nationalist economic policies like tariffs, quotas, and foreign exchange controls by adopting or advocating subnational alternatives or safeguards. While tax breaks, duty drawbacks, and regulatory rollbacks are common, and the list of potential safeguards is all but infinite, Puerto Ricans would reap the rewards of export, employment, and economic growth.
Observers part company over the socio-economic consequences of Puerto's Rico's effort. While mainstream economists tend to underscore the Commonwealth's precipitous postwar growth rates, and therefore label "Operation Bootstraps" an unparalleled success (Baumol and Wolff 1996) , their critics underscore the persistence of poverty, inequality, and emigration, and therefore provide a more nuanced assessment (Dietz 1987) . "The very success of the venture generated its stagnation," argues William
Goldsmith. "It was designed to create jobs and raise industrial wages from abysmally low to just very low. In doing that, the incentive corporations previously had for relocating to Puerto Rico was destroyed" (Goldsmith quoted in Henderson 1990, p. 30) . By the mid1960s, therefore, ADL had discovered-and in many ways created-a new market for offshore production sites in rival locations including Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Taiwan, and South Korea (Schrank 2003, p. 439 After all, the border towns and their boosters had always felt put upon by Mexico City (Martínez 1978; Williams 1990) , and their sense of outrage and injustice had only intensified in the era of ISI, urban bias, and the capital's transformation into an "urban leviathan" (Davis 1994) . Furthermore, the northerners had reason to be worried. "By the 1960s," according to Edward Williams, "the once powerful role of the Norteños in the Mexico City government had diminished, suggesting that the northerners may have feared that their interests were in jeopardy" (Williams 1990, p. 308) . Municipal neoliberalism is arguably a historical artifact, however, for FTZs and related incentives are apparently on the verge of extinction. On one hand, they are rendered redundant by more thoroughgoing trade reforms like the ones adopted throughout Latin America in the late 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, they are constrained by the World Trade Organization and related bodies-that is, by trade agreements that are designed by skeptics who hope to hasten their demise in favor of more thoroughgoing reforms in any event (Schrank 2001; Beattie and Fifield 2005) . By the late twentieth century, in fact, neoliberalism had assumed pride of place nationally and the mantle of opposition had passed from municipal neoliberalism to municipal socialism.
Municipal Socialism in Contemporary Latin America
ISI's traditional beneficiaries responded to the advent of national-level free market reform by embracing municipal socialism in the late twentieth century.
Experiments in municipal socialism find commonality in a set of policies designed to expand and improve municipal services, engage in redistributive spending, increase taxes, facilitate popular participation, and generally strengthen the role of the local state.
Municipal socialists extend basic services like water, sewerage, roads, and mass transit to long-neglected urban peripheries, adopt local alternatives to healthcare, education, and housing programs that have been all but abandoned by national governments, and bolster the social wage by embracing cash grants for the elderly or families of at-risk schoolchildren. Other measures including micro-credit and real estate subsidies are targeted at small businesses and cooperatives and channeled through innovative lending institutions and industry incubators.
Municipal socialists hope to pay for their various programs by undertaking fiscal reforms designed to broaden the tax base, raise marginal tax rates, render tax collection more efficient, and reduce corruption and waste in government expenditure. While their calls for redistribution are consistent with the demands of their populist predecessors, and have thereby provoked hostile and often ill-informed elite reactions (Economist 1998) their emphasis on "good government" resonates with the ideology of municipal socialism prevalent in Europe and North America a century ago (Bremner 1950, pp. 478-9; see also Cohn 1910; Gruber 1991; Radford 2003) , and is therefore surprisingly compatible with the contemporary dictates and preferences of the international donor community.
Unlike the traditional populist or clientelist machines and parties that undergirded ISI and continued into the neoliberal era, however, and more pointedly than their European and North American predecessors, Latin America's municipal socialists emphasize-and in many ways depend upon-popular participation in local government.
If free trade zones are the characteristic features of municipal neoliberalism, participatory policies-ranging from public meetings on government spending and urban planning to collaborative provision of services like cooperative housing, health clinics, and preschools-are the hallmarks of municipal socialism. Not all cities listed in Table 2 make use of each of municipal socialism's tools, of course, but most employ a combination of several elements such that a family resemblance or tendency becomes clear.
The impetus for municipal socialism can be traced not only to the failures of ISI in the 1970s but to the debt crisis and structural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. Latin America's major cities grew rapidly under ISI-from roughly the late 1940s through the 1960s-and the region's governments offered their urban constituents a variety of benefits including food subsidies, low cost utilities, minimum wages, and collective bargaining rights. According to Susan Eckstein, the primary beneficiaries of labor market regulation included skilled workers, public employees, and the middle classes, but urban residents more generally gained entitlements to inexpensive housing and public services (Eckstein 2006, p. 10 and p. 35) , though these were most often provided by national, not local, governments.
Of course, rapid urbanization under ISI engendered problems for local planners, including depressed growth or even population decline in city centers and rapid expansion in remote and therefore underserved shantytowns (Portes 1989, p. 8) . But the problems of the ISI era paled in comparison with those of the neoliberal era inaugurated by the debt crisis of the early 1980s. After all, the various measures adopted the combat the crisis included austerity and adjustment measures that provoked declining public service provision, falling incomes, rising inflation, unemployment, and the reduction or elimination of vital subsidies and national social welfare programs (Castells, et al 1989; Villa and Rodríguez 1996; Burki and Edwards 1996; Eckstein 2006, p. 27) . Paulo and the surrounding "ABC Paulista" metropolitan region as well as in the nearby port city of Santos. White-collar workers including professionals, teachers, bank workers, and civil servants played a central role in both the CUT and the PT (Keck 1992, pp. 190-193) . Popular movements organized around collective consumption issues proliferated in and around São Paulo and often supported labor struggles as well (Caccia Bava 1994; Keck 1992) .
At the same time, however, the state of São Paulo was bearing the brunt of Brazil's crisis and restructuring. Unemployment and informalization grew rapidly, especially in the industrial labor force, and the state lost nearly 150,000 formal jobs in the automobile industry alone between 1986 and 1996 (Klink: on-line). Municipal socialism therefore emerged with force after the 1988 elections, in which voters in the major cities largely rejected the governing party that had overseen the crisis; the PT took São Paulo, Santos, and three of the largest ABC cities, as well as other large industrial and port cities like Porto Alegre and Vitória.
The PT mayors were either union leaders or middle-class professionals and included a psychotherapist and a social worker. They emphasized different aspects of municipal socialism in different Paulista cities. For instance, the mayor of Santos won fame for replacing the city's private bus company with a municipal corporation, creating a network of decentralized health clinics, and organizing a one-day sympathy strike in support of dockworkers facing layoffs from the nationally-mandated privatization of the port (Branford and Kucinski 1995, pp. 83-86) . The mayor of Santo André introduced basic income support, a municipal micro-credit program, and an urbanization program for shantytowns (Branford and Kucinski 2003, p. 47) . And the first PT mayor of São Paulo (1989 built community-managed housing, improved education and healthcare (e.g., building five new hospitals), provided peripheral infrastructure and social services, and lowered the cost of public transit in part by expanding and in part by reallocating municipal spending (Kowarick and Singer 1994; Branford and Kucinski 1995, pp. 80-83) . PT mayors simultaneously attempted to implement a variety of participatory programs including the participatory budgeting (PB) initiatives for which their cities are by now justifiably famous. PB is characterized by public debate and (to a greater or lesser extent) determination of municipal investment and spending priorities and is perhaps most often associated with Porto Alegre, arguably the most successful case of municipal socialism in Brazil.
The PT governed Porto Alegre for four consecutive mayoral terms (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) .
The city's industrial history is by now familiar and provides the essential context for municipal socialism: rapid growth during the "miracle" years followed by stagnation, Under the PT, Porto Alegre embraced and exemplified the entire municipal socialist agenda. The city government adopted participatory budgeting and responded to popular preferences by extending and improving public service provision. Between the late 1980s and the late 1990s the PT almost doubled the size of the sewage networkfrom 477 miles to 850 miles-and connected 135,000 domiciles, paved 186 miles of roads, extended piped water and garbage collection services throughout the city, and increased the number of routes and riders served by the municipal bus company (Goldfrank 2002b: 292-296) . Social services were expanded as well: thousands of families received public housing or land titles; the number of municipally-run schools more than tripled; a network of more than one hundred municipally-funded and cooperatively-run daycares was established; and the municipality built twenty new neighborhood health clinics and assumed control of the local healthcare system from the state government (Goldfrank 2002b: 294-295) . The city government opened a microcredit bank, built an incubator for small industrial ventures, and started a recycling cooperative. And the PT paid for it all with progressive taxation and a crackdown on evasion (Goldfrank 2002b, pp. 227-228) . Finally, the city's achievements-and particularly its participatory budgeting process-attracted admirers and imitators in scores of cities throughout Brazil and beyond (Goldfrank 2006) . Furthermore, the FA and the PT share common organizational histories. Like the PT, the FA started out stronger in middle-class neighborhoods than in poorer areas (with the exception of one union stronghold) and gained ground among the poor after winning elected office and redistributing income through infrastructural development and the provision of social services (Luna 2004, p. 19) . 9 While Uruguay's traditional parties, the Colorados and Blancos, successfully blocked the FA's most far-reaching participatory programs and tax reforms, they failed to provide a strong alternative to municipal socialism and therefore lost ground to the FA over time. As Luna (2004, p. 21) notes, "the clientelistic apparatuses of both traditional parties atrophied as a result of the economic crisis."
Venezuelan cities provide parallels as well as contrasts. Like Brazil and Uruguay, Venezuela gave birth to a left leaning party with strong ties to dissident labor unions in the late twentieth century (Hellinger 1996) . While representatives of the Radical Cause (CR), as the party is known, assumed control of traditional industrial centers in the early 1990s, and tried to implement municipal socialism in Ciudad Guayana and Caracas, they were decidedly more successful in the former than the latter. After all, Ciudad Guayana had been established in 1961 as part of the national state's effort to expand industrialization and therefore featured stronger industrial unions and weaker traditional party organizations than the capital. The CR, and later a splinter party committed to municipal socialism, governed Ciudad Guayana for over a decade (four consecutive terms) and implemented a number of distributive policies including participatory budgeting and investment in working class neighborhoods (López Maya 1999b) . By way of contrast, the CR achieved little in Caracas and failed to gain re-election (Goldfrank 2002b ).
What accounts for the CR's failure in the capital in the mid-1990s? While party activists embraced municipal socialism in theory, and therefore adopted participatory budgeting measures, they treated the middle classes as their core constituents in practice, and therefore distributed their per capita investments in a "need blind" manner (Goldfrank 2002b, p. 135-137) . As a result, the CR failed to attract lower class support and opened the door to a counterattack from traditional parties like Acción Democrática (AD) that had always been stronger in Caracas than Ciudad Guayana in any event.
Conclusion
Max Weber believed that the social sciences advanced through the construction, critique, and reformulation of the "concepts through which we seek to comprehend reality" (Weber 1949, pp. 105-6) . We have deployed the concepts of municipal neoliberalism and municipal socialism in an effort to comprehend Latin American reality and we therefore believe that our paper's principal contributions are conceptual-that is, that one can find value in the concepts of municipal neoliberalism and municipal socialism without embracing our account of their origins and consequences.
We have nonetheless advanced a preliminary account of the origins of urban policy regimes in late twentieth century Latin America as well. Our account is bivariate.
The first variable-the municipality's traditional orientation to the world economydictates policy preferences. While traditionally outward-oriented cities paid a particularly high price for economic nationalism, and therefore responded to ISI by deploying FTZs in the 1960s and 1970s, their traditionally inward-oriented rivals bore the brunt of austerity and structural adjustment, and therefore adopted distributive countermeasures in the subsequent era of national neoliberal reform. The second variable-the organizational capacities of municipal classes and sectors-determines the degree to which urban elites and activists are able to translate their preferences into reality. While domestically controlled export sectors are likely to be particularly wellorganized, and therefore tend to engender more successful neoliberal experiments than their foreign-controlled counterparts, insurgent parties in cities with broadly based class structures are likely to be particularly encompassing, and therefore tend to engender more sustainable socialist experiments than their more narrowly based counterpartsespecially when they emerge in weak party systems (e.g., Brazil).
One need not understand the origins of municipal policy regimes to recognize their salience, however, and an astute observer will draw at least three conclusions from the neoliberal and socialist experiments we have identified whether or not he or she agrees with our interpretation of their origins and degree of success. First, national economic policy regimes do not penetrate their national territories in a homogeneous fashion; on the contrary, they tend to accommodate, reproduce, and in some cases magnify subnational variation. Second, subnational political and economic experiments are as likely to produce as to be products of the national policies they resemble, for dissident municipalities that pay the price for policy reforms offer their residents space in which to defend their historical gains and launch nationwide counterattacks. And, third, the "subnational comparative method" is therefore an essential counterweight to "whole nation bias" as well as a useful source of additional degrees of freedom (Snyder 2001; Gibson 2005) .
What, then, does the future hold for Latin American cities? We can envision two distinct possibilities. On the one hand, local authorities in traditional export centers like requiring PB in all Dominican municipalities. In El Salvador, municipal governments from across the political spectrum play host to both FTZs and participatory budgeting.
The apparent convergence of local neoliberal and socialist experiments may derive from the shortcomings of each strategy when pursued in isolation. While neoliberalism undercuts the social safety net and contributes to the atomization orworse, from the employer's perspective-mobilization of the citizenry, socialism undercuts investment and renders the creation of income-generating activity less likely.
The current convergence may therefore represent a Polanyian "double movement" (Polanyi 1944 ). Efforts to marketize Latin America at all costs have been reined in by efforts to provide at least minimal social safety nets-but the knitters of those nets seem to recognize that the market is better cushioned than repressed.
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While these experiments are still in process, and face myriad opponents and obstacles, they have a good deal of potential, and advocates of sustainable alternatives to both neoliberalism and populism at the national level would therefore do well to look toward the local level for their models. It is in the cities, and not the legislatures and national palaces, that we will find the most numerous, diverse, and interesting experiments. 
